Cases, Regulations and Statutes by Achenbach, Robert P, Jr
Volume 27 | Number 11 Article 2
5-27-2016
Cases, Regulations and Statutes
Robert P. Achenbach Jr
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/aglawdigest
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, Agricultural Economics Commons,
Agriculture Law Commons, and the Public Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Agricultural Law Digest by an authorized editor of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Achenbach, Robert P. Jr (2016) "Cases, Regulations and Statutes," Agricultural Law Digest: Vol. 27 : No. 11 , Article 2.
Available at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/aglawdigest/vol27/iss11/2
the production of income.  That apparently includes cash rent 
landowners.
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interest in the partnership or two partnerships in which the same 
persons own, directly or indirectly, more than 10 percent of the 
capital	or	profits	interest13 and persons who are engaged in trades 
or businesses under common control.14
 What is “qualified farm indebtedness”?  To be eligible to be 
treated	as	“qualified	farm	indebtedness,”	the	indebtedness	must	
be incurred directly in connection with the operation by the 
taxpayer of the trade or business of farming and 50 percent or 
more of the average gross receipts of the taxpayer for the three 
preceding taxable years must be attributable to the trade or 
business of farming.15 Note that the same Internal Revenue Code 
Section16 in extending the provision to other types of businesses, 
in	defining	“qualified	property,”	refers	to	property	which	is	used	
or held for use “in a trade or business or for the production of 
income.”17 That broadens the scope of the provision to include 
cash rent landowners but that is not included in the subsection 
providing	the	rules	for	“qualified	farm	indebtedness”18 which is 
not extended to cash rent landowners.19
How gain is avoided
 Reduction of tax attributes.	 	 The	 1986	 provision	 assures	
avoidance of taxation on discharge of indebtedness (or forgiveness 
of indebtedness) by requiring a reduction of “tax attributes” (such 
as net operating losses for the year and any carryover of losses 
to that year) and by reduction of income tax basis on eligible 
property.20
 Reduction of income tax basis.  After the tax attributes have 
been reduced, any remaining discharge of indebtedness is used to 
reduce	the	income	tax	basis	of	“qualified	property”	of	the	debtor.21 
The	term	“qualified	property”	means	any	property	which	is	used	
or is held for use in a trade or business or for the production of 
income for business and investment entities22 but the more narrow 
provision (trade or business of farming) applies elsewhere to farm 
indebtedness.23
 Order of basis reduction. The order of income tax basis 
reduction is (1) depreciable property, (2) land used or held for 
use	in	the	trade	or	business	of	farming	and	(3)	other	qualified	
property.24 The rules under I.R.C. § 101725 state that the basis 
reduction	is	to	apply	the	language	in	I.R.C.	§	108(g)(3)(C)	which	
states that the test is held for use in a trade or business or held for 
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr
ADvERSE POSSESSION
 EXCLUSIvE USE. The parties were neighbors who both 
engaged in crop farming on their land. Although the case 
originally	involved	five	parcels	of	land	between	the	farms,	only	
two were in issue on appeal.  The evidence included aerial photos 
of the disputed parcels showing the defendant’s planting of crops 
continuously from the defendant’s land onto the disputed parcels. 
The	defendant	also	testified	as	to	the	use	of	the	disputed	parcels	
and the trial court gave the defendant’s testimony more credibility 
than	 the	 plaintiff’s	 testimony.	Although	 the	 plaintiff	 testified	
that the plaintiff used one parcel to turn around equipment, the 
court	held	that	this	occasional	use	was	not	sufficient	to	overcome	
the defendant’s continuous use of the parcel for raising crops. 
Therefore, the defendant was granted title to both parcels based 
on exclusive use of the parcels for crop farming.  Johnson v. 
Fischer, 2016 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 433 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2016).
which provides for portability of a “deceased spousal unused 
exclusion” (DSUE) amount to a surviving spouse. To obtain the 
benefit	of	portability	of	the	decedent’s	DSUE	amount	to	the	spouse,	
the	decedent’s	estate	was	required	to	file	Form	706,	United States 
Estate (and Generation-Skipping Transfer) Tax Return, on or before 
the	date	that	is	9	months	after	the	decedent’s	date	of	death	or	the	last	
day of the period covered by an extension. The decedent’s estate 
did	not	file	a	 timely	Form	706	 to	make	 the	portability	election.	
The estate discovered its failure to elect portability after the due 
date for making the election. The estate represented that the value 
of the decedent’s gross estate was less than the basic exclusion 
amount in the year of the decedent’s death including any taxable 
gifts made by the decedent. The estate requested an extension of 
time	pursuant	to	Treas.	Reg.	§	301.9100-3	to	elect	portability	of	
the decedent’s DSUE amount pursuant to I.R.C. § 2010(c)(5)(A). 
The	IRS	granted	the	estate	an	extension	of	time	to	file	Form	706	
with the election. Ltr. Rul. 201620008, Jan. 28, 2016.
FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION
 AMERICAN OPPORTUNITY  CREDIT. The taxpayer was 
enrolled	full	time	at	a	university	during	2011	and	incurred	$11,748	
in	tuition	and	education	expenses.	The	taxpayer	qualified	for	tax-
free	educational	benefits	under	the	Post-9/11	GI	Bill,	including	the	
Yellow Ribbon GI Education Enhancement Program, and during 
2011,	the	Department	of	Veterans	Affairs	paid	$11,748	directly	to	
the University of Phoenix on the taxpayer’s behalf. Because this 
amount covered all of his tuition and related educational expenses, 
the taxpayer did not incur any student loan debt or receive any 
scholarships for 2011. The university issued the taxpayer a Form 
1098-T,	Tuition Statement,	for	2011,	which	reflected	the	taxpayer’s	
student	status	as	at	least	half-time	and	the	total	payment	of	$11,748	
received	for	qualified	tuition	and	related	expenses.	The	taxpayer	
provided this form to a tax return preparer who included a deduction 
for the American Opportunity Credit (AOC) on the 2011 return. 
Under I.R.C. § 25A(g)(2) and  Treas. Reg. § 1.25A-5(c)(1), in 
determining	the	amount	of	the	AOC,	qualified	tuition	and	related	
expenses for any academic period must be reduced by certain 
tax-free educational assistance allocable to such period. For this 
purpose, the term “tax-free educational assistance” means (1) a 
qualified	scholarship	that	is	excludable	from	income	under	I.R.C.	
§ 117; (2) a veterans’ or member of the armed forces’ educational 
assistance	allowance	under	chapter	30,	31,	32,	34	or	35	of	title	38	
of the United States Code, or under chapter 1606 of title 10 of the 
United States Code; (3) employer-provided educational assistance 
that is excludable from income under I.R.C. § 127; or (4) any other 
educational assistance that is excludable from gross income (other 
than as a gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance within the meaning of 
I.R.C. § 102(a)). The court held that the taxpayer was not entitled 
to any AOC for 2011 because the taxpayer did not personally pay 
for any education expenses in 2011. Lara v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 
2016-96.
 COOPERATIvES. The taxpayer was a farmers’ cooperative 
BANkRUPTCY
GENERAL
 DISCHARGE. The debtor had owned and operated a farm 
and cattle business as a sole proprietor. During litigation with the 
debtor’s sons, the debtor transferred title to the farm to the debtor’s 
wife. After the sons were awarded a money judgment, the trial 
court ruled that the transfer of the real property was fraudulent 
and ordered the transfer voided.  In 2012 the debtor transferred 
the farm to a limited liability company which had the wife as the 
sole	member.	Less	than	a	year	later	the	debtor	filed	for	Chapter	7.	
The debtor’s bankruptcy schedules did not list the farm property 
as	belonging	to	the	LLC	but	later	filed	amended	schedules	which	
did	list	the	property	as	owned	by	the	LLC.	The	sons	filed	a	motion	
to deny discharge to the debtor under Section 727(a)(2) (intent to 
hinder, delay or defraud creditors), Section 727(a)(4)(A) (false oath) 
and Section 727(a)(5) (loss of assets). The court held that discharge 
was denied under Sections 727(a)(2) and (a)(4)(A). The court 
found that the debtor had transferred the farm to the LLC without 
consideration, transferred the farm to a related party, retained 
possession	and	control	over	the	farm,	retained	a	financial	interest	
in the farm, transferred substantially all of the debtor’s assets to 
the LLC, and demonstrated a pattern of hiding ownership of the 
farm. The court noted that the transfer of the farm to the LLC left 
the debtor insolvent. The court also denied discharge under Section 
727(a)(4)(A) because of the debtor’s false bankruptcy schedules 
which claimed assets not owned by the debtor and omitted material 
facts about the farm ownership. In re Rademacher, 2016 Bankr. 
LEXIS 1873 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2016).
FEDERAL FARM
PROGRAMS
 INSPECTION SERvICES. The AMS has announced the 2016 
rates	it	will	charge	for	voluntary	grading,	inspection,	certification,	
auditing and laboratory services for a variety of agricultural 
commodities including meat and poultry, fruits and vegetables, 
eggs, dairy products, and cotton and tobacco. The 2016 regular, 
overtime, holiday, and laboratory services rates will be applied at 
the	beginning	of	the	crop	year,	fiscal	year	or	as	required	by	law	
(June 1 for cotton programs) depending on the commodity. 81 Fed. 
Reg. 27387 (May 6, 2016).
 FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAXATION
 PORTABILITY. The decedent died, survived by a spouse, on a 
date after the effective date of the amendment of I.R.C. § 2010(c), 
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association	which	files	a	consolidated	federal	income	tax	return	
on Form 1120-C, U.S. Income Tax Return for Cooperative 
Associations,	 on	 the	basis	of	 a	fiscal	year.	The	 taxpayer	 sold	 a	
broad range of farm supplies – including energy products (such 
as diesel fuel, propane, heating oil, and gasoline), crop nutrients, 
crop protection products and livestock feed – to its local farm 
supply cooperative members, and they in turn sold those products 
to their farmer and rancher members. The taxpayer also sold farm 
supplies directly to farmer and rancher members.  The taxpayer 
paid patronage dividends to members. The taxpayer generally did 
not pay patronage dividends to nonmembers, but the taxpayer’s 
bylaws provide that a nonmember can be eligible to share in 
patronage dividends if the taxpayer agrees to conduct business with 
the nonmember on a patronage basis. The taxpayer has agreements 
to conduct business with a few nonmembers on a patronage basis, 
but most nonmembers do not share in patronage dividends. The 
taxpayer referred to members and nonmembers who are eligible to 
share in patronage dividends as “patrons.” The taxpayer instituted a 
new system which allows patrons to make greater use of the internet 
and computers in their contacts with the taxpayer. The prospective 
patron can access the application form online but mails a printed 
copy	to	the	taxpayer.	The	taxpayer	also	provided	a	method	of	filling	
out the application and consent form online and submitting the form 
online as well. The taxpayer requested a ruling that a consent for 
a patron that the taxpayer obtained electronically under the new 
process will be a valid “consent in writing” of the patron within the 
meaning	of	I.R.C.	§	1388(c)(2)(A).	Under	Treas.	Reg.	§	1.1388-
1(c)(3)(i), no special form is required for the written consent so 
long as the document on which it is made clearly discloses the 
terms of the consent. Consent can be made on a signed invoice, 
sales slip, delivery ticket, marketing agreement, or other document, 
on which appears the appropriate consent. The IRS ruled that the 
taxpayer’s new process for obtaining consent will involve patrons 
completing and submitting an online form and this on-line form 
should be considered an “other document” within the meaning 
of	Treas.	Reg.	§	1.1388-1(c)(3)(i).	The	IRS	noted	that,	although	
when Subchapter T was enacted, digital signing of documents was 
unknown, in current times, the submission of electronic documents 
is considered a signed written document. Therefore, the IRS ruled 
that the taxpayer’s new process for obtaining consent is considered 
an	“other	document”	within	the	meaning	of	Treas.	Reg.	§	1.1388-
1(c)(3)(i). Ltr. Rul. 201619003, Feb. 10, 2016.
 CORPORATIONS
  SHAREHOLDER LOANS TO CORPORATION. The 
taxpayers, husband and wife, created a family corporation with 
the husband and wife owning 25 percent each and their children 
owning the remaining 50 percent. The corporation operated the 
husband’s	consulting	business.	Starting	in	the	1990s,	the	taxpayers	
loaned funds to the corporation and claimed the amounts as a 
deduction on their personal Schedule C. The IRS did not challenge 
the deductions until 2010, 2011 and 2012, when the deductions 
were disallowed.  The court upheld the denial of the deductions, 
holding that the loans were investments in the corporation giving 
rise to assets, a loan or a capital contribution to the corporation. The 
taxpayers also argued that the IRS was estopped from challenging 
the deductions because the IRS had not challenged the deductions 
in prior tax years. The court held that, under Auto. Club of Mich. 
v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 183 (1957), the Supreme Court 
held that the Commissioner’s failure to challenge a taxpayer’s 
treatment of an item in an earlier year does not preclude an 
examination of the correctness of the treatment of that item in 
a later year because “[t]he doctrine of equitable estoppel is not a 
bar to the correction by the Commissioner of a mistake of law.” 
Aleamoni v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2016-21.
 EDUCATION EXPENSES. The taxpayer was an enrolled 
agent and had obtained a master’s degree in taxation. The 
taxpayer	 provided	 services	 in	 accounting,	financial	 planning	
and tax return preparation. The taxpayer then decided to attend 
law school, was admitted to the state bar, and began practicing 
law. The tax year involved was 2010 in which the taxpayer 
incurred tuition and fees for attending law school. The taxpayer 
claimed the law school tuition and fees as deductions on the 
Schedule C for the taxpayer’s tax return preparation, accounting 
and	financial	 planning	 business.	 	 	Treas.	Reg.	 §	 1.162-5(b)
(1) provides that two types of educational expenses are not 
deductible. One type is expenses for education that is part of 
a program of study which will lead to qualifying the taxpayer 
for a new trade or business.  The regulation gives the following 
example of the expenses of this type: “A, a self-employed 
individual practicing a profession other than law, for example, 
engineering, accounting, etc., attends law school at night and 
after completing his law school studies receives a bachelor of 
laws degree.” Thus, the court held that the taxpayer could not 
deduct the tuition and fees expenses for law school because the 
education	qualified	the	taxpayer	for	a	new	profession.	Santos 
v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2016-100.
 ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION CREDIT. The 2016 
inflation-adjustment	factors	used	in	determining	the	availability	
of	the	credit	for	renewable	electricity	production,	and	refined	
coal	production	under	I.R.C.	§	45	for	qualified	energy	resources	
and	refined	coal	is	1.5566.	For	calendar	year	2016,	the	inflation-
adjustment	 factor	 for	 Indian	 coal	 production	 is	 1.1934.	The	
credit	for	refined	coal	production	is	$6.810	per	ton	of	qualified	
refined	coal	sold	in	2015.	The	2016	reference	price	for	fuel	used	
as feedstock is $53.74 per ton. The amount of the credit is 4.5 
cents per kilowatt hour on sales of electricity produced from 
wind energy. Because the 2016 reference price for electricity 
produced from wind does not exceed eight cents multiplied by 
the	inflation	adjustment	factor,	the	phaseout	of	the	credit	does	
not apply to such electricity sold during calendar year 2016. 
Because the 2016 reference price for fuel used as feedstock 
for	 refined	 coal	 does	 not	 exceed	 the	 $31.90	 reference	 price	
of	 such	 fuel	 in	 2002	multiplied	 by	 the	 inflation	 adjustment	
factor plus 1.7, the phaseout of the credit does not apply to 
refined	coal	sold	during	calendar	year	2016.	The	phaseout	of	
the credit for electricity produced from closed-loop biomass, 
open-loop biomass, geothermal energy, solar energy, small 
irrigation	power,	municipal	solid	waste,	qualified	hydropower	
production, marine and hydrokinetic renewable energy does not 
apply to such electricity sold during calendar year 2016. The 
reference prices for facilities producing electricity from closed-
loop biomass, open-loop biomass, geothermal energy, solar 
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energy,	small	irrigation	power,	municipal	solid	waste,	qualified	
hydropower production, marine and hydrokinetic renewable 
energy for 2016 have not yet been determined. Notice 2016-34, 
I.R.B. 2016-22.
 EMPLOYEES. The taxpayer was a solely owned limited 
liability company which provided non-medical in-home care 
services to senior citizens. The taxpayer contracted with 35 
workers to provide the services mostly at one senior care 
facility.   The taxpayer did not train the workers and did not 
instruct the workers as to how to perform their duties. Instead, 
the senior care facility provided most of the care instructions. 
The taxpayer did obtain workers’ compensation for the workers. 
The owner of the taxpayer started the operation after researching 
the operation of similar businesses and noted that all treated 
their workers as independent contractors. Post-start up research 
also revealed that a common industry practice was to treat 
such workers as independent contractors. The IRS audited the 
owner of the taxpayer twice and included investigations into the 
taxpayer’s operation. The audits did not result in any change in 
classification	of	the	workers.	The	IRS	performed	an	audit	of	the	
taxpayer’s	 returns	 and	 reclassified	 the	workers	 as	 employees	
and assessed employment taxes. Section 530 of the Revenue 
Act	of	1978	provides	a	safe	harbor	for	taxpayers	who	owe	back	
employment taxes after they erroneously fail to classify certain 
workers	as	employees.		Section	530,	which	is	uncodified,	“allows	
the taxpayer to avoid liability for certain federal employment 
taxes if the taxpayer had a reasonable basis for not treating such 
individual as an employee.” The court held that the taxpayer 
had a reasonable basis for treating the workers as independent 
contractors because the IRS did not reject the taxpayer’s 
treatment during its audit of the owner and the taxpayer had 
made extensive research into the industry practice of treating 
workers as independent contractors. Nelly Home Care, Inc. v. 
United States, 2016-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,280 (E.D. 
Penn. 2016).
 INNOCENT SPOUSE RELIEF.  The taxpayer and former 
spouse	had	filed	a	joint	return	for	2006	for	which	the	IRS	assessed	
a	deficiency.	The	former	spouse	filed	for	innocent	spouse	relief	
and the court held that the spouse had signed the return under 
duress	so	no	joint	return	was	deemed	filed.	That	ruling	was	upheld	
by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme 
Court	denied	certiorari.	The	taxpayer	filed	a	separate	innocent	
spouse	claim	which	was	stayed	until	a	final	decision	was	reached	
in	the	appeals	of	the	first	case.	The	court	held	that	the	issue	of	
the	filing	of	a	joint	return	was	collaterally	estopped	by	the	final	
decision	 in	 the	first	case;	 therefore,	no	 innocent	spouse	relief	
could be granted to the taxpayer. Hiramanek v. Comm’r, T.C. 
Memo. 2016-92.
 PARTNERSHIPS
  ELECTION TO ADJUST BASIS. The taxpayer was 
a limited liability company which elected to be taxed as a 
partnership for federal income tax purposes. In one tax year, the 
taxpayer made liquidating distributions to several members but 
the taxpayer’s tax advisors did not inform the taxpayer of the 
election to adjust the taxpayer’s basis in the taxpayer’s assets. 
The taxpayer requested, and the IRS granted, an extension of 
time	to	file	an	amended	return	making	the	I.R.C.	§	754	election	
to adjust the basis of the partnership assets. Ltr. Rul. 201620002, 
Jan. 7, 2016.
  ENTITY CLASSIFICATION.  The taxpayer was  a limited 
liability company which intended to elect to be taxed as a 
partnership for federal income tax purposes.  The taxpayer failed 
to	 timely	 file	 Form	8832,	Entity Classification Election, and 
sought	an	extension	of	time	to	file	the	form.	The	IRS	granted	the	
extension. Ltr. Rul. 201620005, Feb. 8, 2016.
  The taxpayer was a corporation which formed a limited 
partnership in which interests may be sold in an initial public 
offering. The partnership will be engaged in the production, storage, 
transportation, and marketing of the nitrogen-based fertilizers 
ammonia, ammonium nitrate, ammonium nitrate-ammonia, urea 
(both granulated and in solution), and urea ammonium nitrate, 
all direct application fertilizers. The partnership will sell these 
products in bulk to customers operating in agricultural and 
non-agricultural industries. Under I.R.C. § 7704(a), publicly 
traded partnerships are taxed as corporations. An exception to 
this rule is provided by I.R.C. § 7704(c) for publicly traded 
partnerships	which	have	at	least	90	percent	of	their	income	from	
“qualifying income.” “Qualifying income” includes income from 
the exploration, development, mining or production, processing, 
refining,	transportation,	or	the	marketing	of	any	mineral	or	natural	
resource (including fertilizer, geothermal energy, and timber). The 
IRS ruled that the partnership’s income was qualifying income to 
the extent the nitrogen-based fertilizer products were consistent 
with the industry standards for agricultural fertilizers. Ltr. Rul. 
201619002, Feb. 8, 2016. 
 PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in May 2016 for 
purposes of determining the full funding limitation under I.R.C. § 
412(c)(7), the 30-year Treasury securities annual interest rate for 
this period is 2.62 percent. The 30-year Treasury weighted average 
is	3.06	percent,	and	the	90	percent	to	105	percent	permissible	range	
is 2.76 percent to 3.22 percent. The 24-month average corporate 
bond segment rates for May 2016, without adjustment by the 25-
year	average	segment	rates	are:	1.48	percent	for	the	first	segment;	
3.90	percent	for	the	second	segment;	and	4.90	percent	for	the	third	
segment. The 24-month average corporate bond segment rates 
for April 2016, taking into account the 25-year average segment 
rates,	are:	4.43	percent	for	the	first	segment;	5.91	percent	for	the	
second segment; and 6.65 percent for the third segment.  Notice 
2016-33, I.R.B. 2016-22.
 SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS. In 2011, the taxpayer was 
injured in a federal employment related accident and received 
workers’ compensation payments from the Department of Labor 
Office	of	Workers’	Compensation	Programs.	The	taxpayer	also	
applied for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) disability 
payments. The SSI disability payments were granted; however, 
the Social Security Administration (SSA) withheld the entire 
amount of the payments because the taxpayer’s income, including 
the	workers’	compensation	benefits,	was	too	high.	The	taxpayer	
never actually received the SSI disability benefits in 2011. 
Nevertheless,	 the	SSA	 issued	 the	 taxpayer	 a	Form	SSA-1099,	
Social Security Benefit Statement,	which	reflected	benefits	paid	
in 2011 of attributable to “Workers’ compensation offset.” The 
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taxpayer did not report any of this amount on the 2011 income tax 
return.	I.R.C.	§	86(d)(3)	provides	that	where	a	taxpayer	receives	
less	in	Social	Security	benefits	because	the	taxpayer	is	receiving	
workers’	 compensation	benefits,	 then	 the	 amount	 of	workers’	
compensation	benefits	 that	causes	 the	reduction	(the	so-called	
offset amount) is treated as though it were a Social Security 
benefit	for	purposes	of	determining	gross	income.	Thus,	the	court	
held	that	taxable	Social	Security	benefits	include	the	amount	of	
workers’ compensation payments to the extent that they reduce, 
or	offset,	the	total	Social	Security	benefits	to	which	the	recipient	
is entitled; such offsets do not reduce the taxable amount of Social 
Security	benefits	despite	SSA	not	actually	paying	such	benefits.	
The court noted that, had the taxpayer not applied for the SSI 
benefits,	the	workers’	compensation	benefits	would	not	be	taxable.	
Thompson v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2016-20.
SAFE HARBOR IN TEREST RATES
June 2016
 Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64
110 percent AFR 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70
120 percent AFR 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77
Mid-term
AFR 1.41 1.41 1.41 1.41
110 percent AFR  1.56 1.55 1.55 1.55
120	percent	AFR	 1.70	 1.69	 1.69	 1.68
Long-term
AFR 2.24 2.23 2.22 2.22
110 percent AFR  2.47 2.45 2.44 2.44
120	percent	AFR		 2.70	 2.68	 2.67	 2.67
Rev. Rul. 2016-13, I.R.B. 2016-25.
INSURANCE
 COvERAGE.  The plaintiff raised turkeys in three buildings 
on the plaintiff’s farm. The plaintiff purchased property insurance 
from the defendant through an agent on all the buildings on the 
farm	and	specifically	requested	insurance	on	damage	from	the	
weight of snow, ice and sleet. The agent provided a premium 
quote and claimed that the plaintiff was told that the snow, ice 
and sleet coverage would not take effect until the buildings were 
inspected. The defendant claimed to have given the plaintiff a 
written proposal which stated the same condition. The plaintiff 
purchased the insurance on February 25, 2013. The written policy 
was not received by the plaintiff until March 4, 2013 but was 
backdated to the date of the payment of the premium and did 
not contain the endorsement for the snow, ice and sleet damage 
coverage. On February 26, 2013, two of the turkey buildings 
collapsed from the weight of snow and ice. There was no evidence 
that the plaintiff had any knowledge that the buildings would 
collapse. The defendant denied coverage because the buildings 
were not inspected before the damage occurred. The plaintiff 
filed	suit	for	full	coverage	of	the	loss	and	the	trial	court	granted	
summary judgment to the plaintiff. On appeal, the appellate court 
reversed, noting that several material facts remained at issue. 
The court noted that there was an issue of fact as to whether the 
agent informed the plaintiffs about the need for an inspection 
prior to coverage of the buildings and that there was an issue of 
interpreting the policy as to whether the loss was covered under 
the general weather damage provision. Bolinger v. Clarks Fork 
Mutual Ins. Co., 2016 Mo. App. LEXIS 352 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2016).
LANDLORD AND TENANT
 CORN STOvER.  The plaintiff leased farm land from 
the defendant city under a cash lease. The lease provided for 
automatic renewal from year-to-year with an annual termination 
date of March 1. The city decided to terminate the lease in 2014 
and the plaintiff sued for improper termination, to recover for 
the amount of corn stover that the plaintiff was not allowed to 
take after the last harvest, and the pro rata cost of lime applied in 
2011 (two years of value remained for the lime application). The 
lease provided “Tenant shall not remove from the Real Estate, 
nor burn, any straw, stalks, stubble, or similar plant materials, 
all of which are recognized as the property of Landlord.” The 
lease also required the tenant to obtain written authorization from 
the landlord for any expenses. However, the lease provided that 
the	tenant	was	to	be	reimbursed	for	any	unused	benefits	from	
the application of lime. The city sent the plaintiff a notice of 
termination	on	August	19,	2013,	effective	the	following	March.	
The trial court granted summary judgment to the city on all 
claims and the plaintiff appealed. The plaintiff argued that the 
termination notice was improper because the city council did 
not vote to terminate the lease. The court held that, although 
the entering into the lease required a vote of the council, the 
termination of the lease merely required a directive from the 
council to the city clerk. The plaintiff argued that the application 
of the lime was authorized by the lease provision because the 
plaintiff did not charge for application of the lime. The court 
agreed, holding that the amended provision controlled because 
it	specifically	applied	to	the	application	of	lime	and	the	plaintiff	
did not charge for the application. On the issue of ownership of 
the	corn	stover,	the	court	first	looked	at	Iowa	Code	§	562.5A:	
“Unless otherwise agreed to in writing by a lessor and farm tenant, 
a farm tenant may take any part of the above ground part of a plant 
associated with a crop, at the time of harvest or after the harvest, 
until the farm tenancy terminates as provided in this chapter.” 
The	court	held	that	the	lease	here	did	specifically	provide	that	
the corn stover belonged to the landlord; therefore, the plaintiff 
did not have a contractual right to the corn stover. Hettinger v. 
City of Strawberry Point, Iowa, 2016 Iowa App. LEXIS 467 
(Iowa Ct. App. 2016).
NUISANCE
 RIGHT-TO-FARM. The defendant started a large scale 
commercial composting operation on land zoned agricultural 
in	 2008.	At	 that	 time,	 the	 zoning	 ordinance	 for	 agricultural	
2015).
ZONING
 AGRICULTURAL ZONING.  The defendant board of 
supervisors added a new zoning classification, agricultural 
residential, to allow for the separation of a farm residence with 
one acre of land from farm land originally zoned as agricultural. 
The plaintiffs, husband and wife, purchased a nine acre farm 
and sought to split off one acre with the residence to be zoned 
as agricultural residential. The plaintiffs then planned to build a 
new residence on the remaining eight acres. The county zoning 
committee approved the rezoning but the defendant board of 
supervisors denied the rezoning because it violated the intent of 
the new zoning provision. The intent was to allow existing farm 
residences to be split from farm land which would be still used 
entirely for farming. Here, the plaintiffs would be reducing farm 
land by building a new residence on the remaining farm land 
after the old residence was separated. The trial court ruled for the 
plaintiffs in that the new zoning provision was ambiguous and 
should be interpreted in favor of the free use of land. On appeal 
the	court	reversed,	first	noting	that	a	property	owner	does	not	have	
a right to have a property rezoned for another use. The court noted 
that the plaintiffs purchased the property with full knowledge that 
the current zoning ordinance prohibited the building of a second 
residence on the property. The court held that the defendant 
board did not act illegally or capriciously in determining that the 
requested rezoning would be contrary to the intent of the zoning 
ordinance, which was to preserve farm land. Riniker v. Dubuque 
County Board of Supervisors, 2016 Iowa App. LEXIS 407 
(Iowa Ct. App. 2016).
AGRICULTURAL TAX 
SEMINARS
by Neil E. Harl
Due to serious family medical issues, Dr. Harl has had 
to	 cancel	 at	 least	 the	first	 three	 seminars	 previously	
announced. Although Dr. Harl may need to cancel the 
remaining seminars, except Ames, IA, here are the 
tentative cities and dates for the seminars in 2016 at 
this time:
  August 24-25, 2016 - Quality Inn, Ames, IA
  September 15-16, 2016 - Ramkota Hotel, Sioux Falls, SD
  September 22-23, 2016 - Holiday Inn, Rock Island, IL
  October 11-12, 2016 - Atrium Hotel, Hutchinson, KS
More information will be posted on
www.agrilawpress.com.
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zones	 specifically	 excluded	 operations	 involving	 the	 disposal	
of garbage and other waste material. In 2011 the ordinance was 
amended	to		remove	the	specific	exclusions	but	allowed	merely	
“farms.” In 2014, the defendant began receiving yard waste to 
compost and neighbors complained about the odors from the 
operation. The plaintiff ordered the defendant to cease operating 
the composting operation as a violation of the zoning ordinance. 
When	the	defendant	failed	to	cease	the	operation,	the	plaintiff	filed	
suit alleging that the operation was a violation of the ordinance, 
a public nuisance, and a violation of state environmental quality 
laws. The defendant argued that the composting operation was a 
farm and was protected from enforcement of the actions brought by 
the plaintiff. The court held that the composting operation was not 
a	farm,	either	under	the	ordinance	or	under	the	definition	used	by	
the	Michigan	right-to-farm	law.	The	court	held	that	the	definition	
of “farm product” under the Michigan right-to-farm law, Mich. 
Code	§	286.472(c),	included	only	“plants	and	animals	useful	to	
human beings.” The compost produced by the defendant did not 
meet	this	definition;	therefore,	the	operation	was	not	a	fam	under	
the right-to-farm law. Charter Township of White Lake v. Ciurlik 
Enterprises, 2016 Mich. App. LEXIS 956 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
 PRIORITY.  On April 12, 2012, the debtor obtained a 
production-money loan from the plaintiff bank and the bank 
perfected a security interest in the debtor’s crops, farm products, 
equipment and accounts. The debtor agreed to take over commodity 
futures contracts for corn and soybeans to be delivered to the 
defendant from the debtor’s 2012 crop. The contracts provided 
that the defendant had the right to set off from payments for the 
delivered crops the value of any undelivered crops. The defendant 
did not register its interest in the crops with the Mississippi 
Secretary of State.  The debtor did deliver most of the crops but 
failed to deliver on the soybean contracts; therefore, the defendant 
offset the value of the undelivered soybeans. The plaintiff sued to 
recover the full amount owed for the delivered crops without any 
offset, arguing that it had a prior perfected security interest in the 
delivered crops.   The court found that, because Mississippi has a 
centralized	filing	system,	the	production-money	security	interest	
was	 governed	 by	 the	Food	Security	Act	 of	 1985	 (FSA)	which	
provides that buyers of farm products take the products free of 
security interests unless the buyer received direct notice of the 
security interest or purchased the agricultural products in a state 
with	a	centralized	filing	system.			Under	the	FSA,	a	buyer	of	farm	
products takes subject to a security interest created by the seller if 
the buyer has failed to register with the Secretary of State of such 
state prior to the purchase of farm products; and the secured party 
has	filed	an	effective	financing	statement	or	notice	that	covers	the	
farm products being sold. Thus, the court held that, because the 
defendant did not register and the plaintiff perfected its security 
interest, the plaintiff held a priority security interest in all of the 
debtor’s crops and was entitled to the proceeds of the sale of those 
crops, without setoff for the undelivered crops. Guaranty Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Agrex Incorporated, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 7731 
(5th Cir. 2016), aff’g, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67110 (N.D. Miss. 
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Edition of Dr. Neil E. Harl’s excellent guide for farmers and ranchers who want to make the 
most of the state and federal income and estate tax laws to assure the least expensive and most 
efficient	transfer	of	their	estates	to	their	children	and	heirs.		This	book	contains	detailed	advice	
on assuring worry-free retirement years, using wills, trusts, insurance and outside investments 
as estate planning tools, ways to save on estate settlement costs, and an approach to setting up a 
plan that will eliminate arguments and friction in the family. Federal estate taxation has undergone 
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and advantages of use of business entities, federal farm payments, state laws on corporate 
ownership of farm land, federal gift tax law, annuities, installment obligations, charitable 
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